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"The question is not what power the federal government ought to have
but what powers in fact have been given by the people."1
Determining the division of power between the states and the
federal government has been a debated issue throughout consti-
tutional jurisprudence. Indeed, "[n]o problem has plagued the na-
tion's constitutional history more."2 In joining the union, the states
relinquished power to the federal government.3 The states were not
left without power, as the Tenth Amendment guarantees that powers
not enumerated to the federal government or restricted from the
states are retained by the states.4 The broad language of the
Constitution, however, has resulted in an ongoing debate over what
boundaries should be placed on the power given to the federal
government.
Over one hundred years ago, the Supreme Court maintained
the absolute sovereignty of both levels of government.5 In Texas v.
White, Chief Justice Chase stated: "[I]t may be not unreasonably said
that the preservation of the States, and the maintenance of their
governments, are as much within the design and care of the
Constitution as the preservation of the Union and the maintenance of
the national government."6 Nevertheless, in 1947, the Supreme Court
affirmatively asserted the federal government's authority over state
courts. In Testa v. Katt, the Rhode Island Supreme Court had
declined to resolve a case involving a federal penal statute, claiming
1. United States v. Butler, 297 U.S. 1, 63 (1936).
2. WILLIAM R. CASTO, THE SUPREME COURT IN THE EARLY REPUBLIC: THE CHIEF
JUSTIcESHIPS OF JOHN JAY AND OLIVER ELswORTH 184 (1995) (discussing the limitations on the
power of the federal government and the states, as well as the allocation of power where the two
overlap).
3. For an argument that the Founding Fathers intentionally placed severe limits on the
states and undisputedly set forth the supremacy of the federal government, see WILLIAM P.
MURPHY, THE TRIUMPH OF NATIONALISM: STATE SOVEREIGNTY, THE FOUNDING FATHERS, AND
THE MAKING OF THE CONSTITUTION 409-10 (1976).
4. U.S. CONST. amend. Y-
5. The Court, however, proffered that the two levels of government should not be treated
as foreign jurisdictions by each other. See Minneapolis & St. Louis R.R. v. Bombolis, 241 U.S.
211, 222 (1916) (stating that the federal and state courts should not "be strange or foreign to
each other" but rather "courts of a common country"); Claflin v. Houseman, 93 U.S. 130, 136
(1876) (holding that the federal government "is a concurrent, and within its jurisdiction,
paramount sovereignty" in relation to the states); see also Howlett v. Rose, 496 U.S. 356, 367
(1990) (citing Bombolis, 241 U.S. at 211; Claflin, 93 U.S. at 130).
6. Texas v. White, 74 U.S. 700, 725 (1868). In New York v. United States, Justice
O'Connor referred to this language as "Chief Justice Chase's much quoted words." New York v.
United States, 505 U.S. 144, 162 (1992).
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that, based on state law, the action could not be heard by the Rhode
Island courts.7 The Supreme Court reversed the state court decision
and held that a state court may not refuse to adjudicate claims arising
out of federal law.8 In doing so, the Supreme Court subjected state
courts to "federal commandeering." s State courts no longer had the
authority to determine what cases they would and would not hear;
instead, the dockets of state courts were subject to federal direction.10
Nevertheless, in New York v. United States" and Printz v. United
States 2, the Supreme Court removed both state legislatures and state
executives from similar federal commandeering. Numerous scholars
have analyzed and criticized the wisdom of these decisions, but have
not subsequently reevaluated the meaning and precedential value of
Testa.3 Now that state courts remain the sole branch of state
government subject to federal commandeering, the Testa invasion of
state sovereignty must be justified.
Part II of this Note surveys the role of state courts, the rele-
vant constitutional provisions, and the sovereignty retained by the
states after the creation of the federal government. Part III examines
each of the three paramount decisions involving federal commandeer-
7. Testa v. Katt, 47 A.2d 312, 314 (R.I. 1946), rev'd, 330 U.S. 386 (1947).
8. See Testa v. Katt, 330 U.S. 386, 394 (1947).
9. Federal commandeering causes state governments to be "field offices of the national
bureaucracy," contradicting the idea that each state is sovereign within its own domain,
governing its citizens and providing for their general welfare. While the Constitution and
federal statutes define the boundaries of that domain, they do not harness state power for
national purposes." Cynthia C. Lebow, Federalism and Federal Product Liability Reform: A
Warning Not Heeded, 64 TENN. L. REV. 665, 684 (1997) (quoting FERC v. Mississippi, 456 U.S.
742, 777 (1982) (O'Connor, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part)). One commentator argues
that federal commandeering is economically inefficient. See Roderick M. Hills, Jr., The Political
Economy of Cooperative Federalism: Why State Autonomy Makes Sense and "Dual Sovereignty"
Doesn't, 96 MICH. L. REV. 813, 928-33 (1998). For an argument that Congress lacks the power
to force jurisdiction on state courts, see generally Michael G. Collins, Article III Cases, State
Court Duties, and the Madisonian Compromise, 1995 WIs. L. REV. 39, 145-94 (1995).
10. State courts are likewise directed by the federal legislature since it is Congress that
determines the jurisdiction for its federal statutes. For an argument that the Framers gave
power to the Supreme Court to void state law and simultaneously gave Congress the power to
confer jurisdiction over federal law cases, see generally James S. Liebman & William F. Ryan,
'Some Effectual Power": The Quantity and Quality of Decisionmaking Required of Article IH
Courts, 98 COLUM. L. REV. 696 (1998).
11. New York, 505 U.S. at 149 (discussing state legislatures).
12. Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 98, 117 S. Ct. 2365, 2370-76 (1997) (discussing state
executive officers).
13. See, e.g., Scott Boehne, Mack v. United States: The Federal Eagle Nestles into the
Executive Branch of State Government, 30 GA. L. REV. 1117 (1996); Timothy Jones & Janine
Tyne, Printz v. United States: An Assault Upon the Brady Act or a Tenth Amendment
Fortification?, 10 ST. JOaN's J. LEGAL COMMENT. 179 (1994); Richard E. Levy, New York v.
United States: An Essay on the Uses and Misuses of Precedent, History, and Policy in
Determining the Scope of Federal Power, 41 U. KAN. L. REV. 493 (1993).
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ing: Testa v. Katt, New York v. United States, and Printz v. United
States. Part IV compares the characteristics of state courts to those of
the other two state branches, state legislatures and state executives.
Part V analyzes the merits of the Testa decision, concluding that the
Supreme Court erred in its analysis. Part VI then proposes that it
may be the source of the commandeering that distinguishes the Testa
decision, rather than the state government branch that is the subject
of commandeering. The question remains why state courts are
treated differently given this country's dedication to treating the
branches equally and to avoiding improper allocation of power among
the branches.14 Part VII concludes that regardless of the unequal
treatment of state courts which results from Testa v. Katt, Testa will
likely remain a pillar of federalism and constitutionally derived
doctrine.
II. LEGAL AND HISTORICAL FOUNDATIONS
A. The Role of State Courts
Although some commentators have argued that adoption of the
Constitution created both the federal government and the states that
comprise it, 15 the states themselves clearly preceded the national gov-
ernment. 16 As natural successors to the British colonies, the states'
legal and territorial existence was established prior to the ratification
of the United States Constitution. 7 The role of the state courts like-
wise predates the creation of the national government. 8
State courts historically have served a critical function in
adjudicating disputes and developing remedies for the claims
presented. 9 In this capacity, state courts are an important source of
14. See infra Part M.B-C.
15. See JACKN. RAKOVE, ORIGINAL MEANINGS: POLITICS AND IDEAS IN THE MAKING OF THE
CONSTrrUTION 163-68 (1997) (acknowledging arguments of simultaneous creation).
16. See id. (noting that state government was created prior to federal government).
17. See id. Indeed, the fact that the Constitution required ratification by "nine States"
demonstrates their prior existence. U.S. CONST. art. VII.
18. 'The state courts became direct heirs of the colonial courts and grand-heirs of the
British judiciary" with the American Revolution causing no 'Tundamental change" in the state
judicial institutions. DANIEL R. GRANT & H.C. NIXON, STATE AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT IN
AMERICA 388 (2d ed. 1968).
19. See Henry M. Hart, Jr., The Relations Between State and Federal Law, 54 COLUM. L.
REV. 489, 492 (1954); see also GRANT & NIXON, supra note 18, at 387 (stating that state courts
provide a wide spectrum of governmental contact for citizens, from interpreting the Constitution
to resolving individual disputes). For an historical analysis of the development of state courts,
146 [Vol. 52:143
1999] FEDERAL COMMANDEERING
law for issues not addressed by legislatures or federal courts.20 As
creators of common law, state courts are accessible to litigants who
need clarification or correction of a legal matter.21
Because state courts possess primitive jurisdiction,22 they are
not limited to delegated or enumerated powers as is the federal
judiciary.2 Primitive jurisdiction has existed since the creation of the
courts themselves. 2 The Framers intended for state courts to
preserve this jurisdiction. In The Federalist, Alexander Hamilton
stated, "I shall lay it down as a rule, that the [s]tate courts will retain
the jurisdiction they now have, unless it appears to be taken away in
one of the enumerated modes."2 Hamilton continued to assert that
"the [sitate courts will be divested of no part of their primitive
jurisdiction."26 The primitive jurisdiction of the state courts remained
intact throughout the creation of the federal government and
see HENRY ROBERT GLICK & KENNETH N. VINEs, STATE COURT SYSTEMS 18-28 (1973); GRANT &
NIXON, supra note 18, at 390-94 (discussing the structural mechanisms of state courts).
20. See Hart, supra note 19, at 492.
21. See id. at 493; see also Dennis G. LaGory, Federalism, Separation of Powers, and
Individual Liberties, 40 VAND. L. REv. 1353, 1363-64 (1987) (noting that "state
governments... protect the basic liberties to which mankind has always been entitled").
22. Primitive jurisdiction refers to the authority possessed by the state courts prior to the
adoption of the Constitution. See Martin v. Hunters Lessee, 14 U.S. (1 Wheat.) 304, 335 (1816)
(recognizing that state court jurisdiction existed before the adoption of the Constitution); cf
Tafflin v. Levitt, 493 U.S. 455, 458 (1990) (finding that state courts possess concurrent
jurisdiction to hear RICO claims even without explicit grant of such jurisdiction).
23. See GRANT & NIXON, supra note 18, at 388. The jursidictional limits of the federal
judiciary are found in Article H of the Constitution and in 28 U.S.C. §§ 1251-59, 1291-96, and
1330-68 (1994). See infra Part H.B.1.
24. But cf. In re Tarble, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 397, 412 (1871) (holding that the state court
lacked jurisdiction to inquire into a soldier's status because Congress did not grant the court
such jurisdiction).
25. THE FEDERALIST No. 82 (Alexander Hamilton) (emphasis in original). But cf. Calvin
R. Massey, State Sovereignty and the Tenth and Eleventh Amendments, 56 U. Cm. L. REV. 61,
95-96 (1989) (asserting that the essays in THE FEDERALIST were newspaper propaganda
deserving little attention). The doctrine of "original intent' is a "'method of
constitutional... interpretation that seeks to discern the original meaning of the words being
construed as that meaning is revealed in the intentions of those who created the law or the
constitutional provision in question.'" Peter A. Lauricella, Comment, The Real "Contract with
America: The Original Intent of the Tenth Amendment and the Commerce Clause, 60 ALB. L.
REV. 1377, 1382 (1997) (quoting Gary L. McDowell, Original Intent, in THE OXFORD COMPANION
TO THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 613, 613 (Kermit L. Hall et al. eds., 1992)).
Departing from the original meaning of words "undermines the essence of our republican form
of government." Id. The Supreme Court often looks to essays in The Federalist when it
interprets the Constitution. See, e.g., Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 98, 117 S. Ct. 2365,
2372-78 (1997) (Scalia, J.) (discussing numerous essays from The Federalist); New York, v.
United States, 505 U.S. 144, 155 (1992) (O'Connor, J.) (citing The Federalist).
26. THE FEDERALIST No. 82 (Alexander Hamilton).
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continues to exist today.27 Although the development of the federal
judiciary has modified the jurisdiction of state courts,2 the primitive
jurisdiction of these courts has survived.
B. The Constitutional Provisions
Three constitutional provisions are relevant in addressing
federal commandeering. The power of the Supreme Court as origi-
nated in Article III provides the basis for the Court's ability to make
decisions regarding commandeering. Federal commandeering con-
cerns the power of federal law over the states; therefore, the
Supremacy Clause, found in Article VI, Section 2, is at issue. Finally,
the Tenth Amendment, which reserves powers to the states, serves as
the authority for preventing commandeering of two branches of state
government, the legislative and executive branches.
1. Article III-The Judicial Power
Federal judicial power is created in Article III of the
Constitution. The text of the Article states: "[t]he judicial Power of
the United States, shall be vested in one supreme Court, and in such
inferior Courts as the Congress may... ordain and establish."29 In
Marbury v. Madison, Chief Justice Marshall declared that the
Supreme Court has the power to interpret the Constitution for all
three branches of the federal government if a constitutional issue is
before the Court.30 Therefore, although its jurisdiction is subject to
27. See Henry M. Hart, Jr., The Power of Congress to Limit the Jurisdiction of Federal
Courts: An Exercise in Dialectic, 66 HARV. L. REV. 1362, 1401-02 (1953) (maintaining that the
state courts always have their general jurisdiction).
28. Federal courts possess jurisdiction to hear state law claims in cases of diversity or on
supplemental grounds. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 1332, 1367 (1994). The Supreme Court has power to
review decisions arising out of state courts, see Martin v. Hunter's Lessee, 14 U.S. (1 Wheat.)
304, 314-15 (1816), but only on a federal question when the decision by the state court lacks
adequate and independent state grounds, see Fox Film Corp. v. Muller, 296 U.S. 207, 210 (1935);
Murdock v. City of Memphis, 87 U.S. (20 Wall.) 590, 596 (1875); see also MITCHELL WENDELL,
RELATIONS BETWEEN TiE FEDERAL AND STATE COURTS 23 (1949) (discussing the need for
litigants to know which court-state or federal-possesses the proper ability to hear individual
cases).
29. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1.
30. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 146-47 (1803). Marshall declared that "[it]
is emphatically the province and duty of the judicial department to say what the law is." Id. at
177. The Supreme Court likewise has power to interpret the Constitution for the states. See
Cooper v. Aaron, 358 UtS. 1, 18 (1958).
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the powers granted in Article HI,31 the Supreme Court is the ultimate
arbiter of the law.32
2. Article VI-The Supremacy Clause
The supremacy of federal law over state law stems from Article
VI of the Constitution. This Article states that the Constitution itself
and all federal law created under its authority "shall be the supreme
Law of the Land."33 From the inception of the national government,
the Anti-Federalists feared this language would nullify all prior rights
and authorities of the states.3 The more popular viewpoint, however,
reflected the Clause's necessity to assure that states would execute
their national obligations in good faith,35 and thus the Supremacy
Clause was included. The Supremacy Clause provides a minimum for
direct control and review of state law while recognizing state auton-
omy.36
3. The Tenth Amendment
The Tenth Amendment of the Constitution guarantees that the
states or the people retain every power not delegated to the federal
government or restricted from the states.37 This Amendment asserts
that the states "possess residual sovereign powers, but the extent of
those sovereign powers is measured by the area left for state action
after Congress has validly exercised its delegated powers."38 The
addition of "or to the people" to the Amendment recognizes that there
are rights beyond those possessed by the states or the federal govern-
31. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2; see also MURPHY, supra note 3, at 234-39 (discussing the
jurisdiction of the Supreme Court).
32. For a discussion that the Framers intended this result, see supra note 3.
33. U.S. CONST. art VI, cl. 2. The Supremacy Clause finds its mechanism of enforcement
by binding "the Judges in every State." Id.
34. See RAKOVE, supra note 15, at 324-25.
35. See id. at 172.
36. See MURPHY, supra note 3, at 221. One commentator argues that the Supremacy
Clause has been utilized to "demarcat[e] the boundaries of the federal regulatory state." S.
Candice Hoke, Transcending Conventional Supremacy: A Reconstruction of the Supremacy
Clause, 24 CONN. L. REV. 829, 829 (1992). Professor Hoke proposes to "expos[e] [the Supremacy
Clause's] logical inconsistencies and the interpretative threads that have greatly enhanced the
movement toward nationalization of regulatory power." Id. at 831.
37. U.S. CONST. amend. X
38. Massey, supra note 25, at 73.
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ment.39 Unlike the states, the federal government must find a consti-
tutional source for its power.40
The significance of the Tenth Amendment is frequently ques-
tioned. One scholar maintains that the Tenth Amendment adds noth-
ing to the rest of the Constitution.41 Although the Tenth Amendment
sought to guarantee a limited national government, the meaning of
the Amendment relies on the interpretation of the original
Constitution.42 The states use the Tenth Amendment to challenge
federal law that compromises the political or legislative processes of
the states.43 The Tenth Amendment was initially invoked to provide
dual federalism and to serve as a constant reminder that Congress
could legislate only if it had express or implied power to do so.44 This
use of the Tenth Amendment ended in 1937,45 and did not resurface
until the New York decision in 1992.46 During the interim, the Tenth
Amendment was frequently used to limit the jurisdiction of federal
courts, but not federal legislative power.
47
39. See IRVING BRANT, THE BILL OF RIGHTS: ITS ORIGIN AND MEANING 65-67 (1965); see
also Kathryn Abrams, Note, On Reading and Using the Tenth Amendment, 93 YALE L.J. 723,
739 (1984) (discussing the Amendment's reservation of power to the people to express their will
when other authority is abused).
40. See DANIEL R. MANDELKER & DAWN CLARK NETSCH, STATE AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT
IN AFEDERAL SYSTEM 29-30 (1977). "The national government must look to the Constitution for
powers; the states must look to that document only for limitations." GRANT & NIXON, supra note
18, at 34.
41. See EDWARD DUMBAULD, THE BILL OF RIGHTS AND WHAT IT MEANS TODAY 65 (1957).
Likewise, Harrison Otis of Massachusetts argued that addition of the First Amendment "wiped
out the Tenth Amendment." See BRANT, supra note 39, at 256-57. Another commentator argues
that the Tenth Amendment was simply a declaration of the relationship between the states and
the federal government and plays no part in substantively restraining federal powers. See
Lauricella, supra note 25, at 1389-94; see also Erwin Chemeriusky, Formalism and
Functionalism in Federalism Analysis, 13 GA. ST. U. L. REV. 959, 960 (1997) (The Constitution
is silent about the allocation of power between federal and state governments.").
42. See Anthony B. Ching, Travelling Down the Unsteady Path: United States v. Lopez,
New York v. United States, and The Tenth Amendment, 29 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 99, 140 (1995).
43. See Abrams, supra note 39, at 737.
44. See Erwin Chemerinsky, The Values of Federalism, 47 FLA. L. REV. 499, 505-06 (1995).
Dual federalism is the theory that the states limit the power of the national government and the
national government limits the power of the states. For an argument that this balance no
longer exists, see generally Edward S. Corwin, The Passing of Dual Federalism, 36 VA. L. REV. 1
(1950).
45. See Chemerinsky, supra note 44, at 506.
46. For a discussion of the most recent Tenth Amendment adjudication, see generally
John R. Vile, Truism, Tautology or Vital Principle? The Tenth Amendment Since United States
v. Darby, 27 CUMB. L. REV. 445 (1996-97). See infra Part Il.B-C (discussing recent decisions
applying the Tenth Amendment).
47. See Chemerinsky, supra note 44, at 502.
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C. The Sovereignty of the States
Under the Tenth Amendment, the states retained substantial
sovereign authority.48 Preserving the sovereignty of the states was
crucial to the Framers.49  John Calhoun's view of the federal
government dictated that the states are separate and distinct political
entities.5° Historically, Congress has been sensitive to state interests
and the scope of state power.51  Over the years, however, Supreme
Court decisions have diminished state sovereignty.52 Only recent
decisions removing state legislatures and state officials from federal
commandeering have bolstered arguments in favor of state
sovereignty.
48. See Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452, 457 (1991). One commentator argues, however,
that it is the Guarantee Clause of the Constitution that restrains federal interference with state
autonomy and that the language of the Tenth Amendment provides little support for the result
found in cases like New York v. United States. See Deborah Jones Merritt, Republican
Governments and Autonomous States: A New Role for the Guarantee Clause, 65 U. Cow. L.
REv. 815, 815-19 (1994). The Guarantee Clause reads, in pertinent part, "[tihe United States
shall guarantee to every State in this Union a Republican Form of Government." U.S. CONST.
art. IV, § 4.
49. James Madison argued for a federal form of government, regarding the union as a
confederacy of sovereign states. See THE FEDERALIST No. 39 (James Madison). John Calhoun,
the most recognized advocate of sovereign states, "produced an extraordinary thoughtful and
fully developed theory of decentralized union." Calvin R. Massey, The Locus of Sovereignty:
Judicial Review, Legislative Supremacy, and Federalism in the Constitutional Traditions of
Canada and the United States, 1990 DUKE L.J. 1229, 1249. Massey further asserts that "[tjhe
merits of the theory have been obscured by its association with Calhoun." Id; see generally
MURPHY, supra note 3, at 409-17 (discussing the views of several of the Framers). For a discus-
sion on the importance of sovereignty, see MICHAEL Ross FOWLER & JULIE MARIE BuNCK, LAW,
POWER, AND THE SOvEREIGN STATE: THE EVOLUTION AND APPLICATION OF THE CONCEPT OF
SOVEREiGNTY 36-37 (1995). For an outline of the historical definition of sovereignty, see id. at 4-
8.
50. See John Calhoun, On the Veto Power, in 4 WORKS OF JOHN CALHOUN 74,80-81 (1854).
51. See MURPHY, supra note 3, at 412.
52. See CASTO, supra note 2, at 184-88 (providing an overview of decisions). For limita-
tions on state sovereignty, see generally 16A AM JUR. 2D Constitutional Law §§ 282-84 (1998).
When the Court does protect state government, three benefits are identifiable: "decreasing the
likelihood of federal tyranny, enhancing democratic rule by providing government that is closer




A. State Judiciaries: Testa v. Katt
On August 3, 1944, Alfred Testa paid $1,100 to purchase an
automobile from Harry Katt.53 This minor transaction ultimately
resulted in the seminal case governing the relationship between state
and federal courts and a doctrine of modern-day federalism s At the
time of Mr. Testa's purchase, Regulation 540 of the Federal
Emergency Price Control Act of 1942 set the maximum legal price for
an automobile at $890.55 Mr. Testa had overpaid by $210 and thus
brought suit in his home state of Rhode Island to recover the
difference. 56 The court entered a directed verdict for Mr. Testa. 7 The
defendant appealed, questioning the jurisdiction of the Rhode Island
state court system. 58
The issue at the state supreme court level was whether Rhode
Island courts must hear cases involving violations of penal statutes.59
Previously, in Robinson v. Norato, the Rhode Island Supreme Court
had addressed the nature of the Emergency Price Control Act in a suit
between a tenant and landlord.60 The Robinson court determined that
the Emergency Price Control Act was a penal statute in an
international sense6 ' and therefore "not cognizable in the courts of
th[e] state."62 The Robinson court specifically rejected the contention
53. See Testa v. Katt, 47 A.2d 312, 312 (R.I. 1946), rev'd, 330 U.S. 386 (1947).
54. Yet, in Palmore v. United States, Justice White viewed Testa v. Katt as "merely re-
flect[ing] longstanding constitutional decision and policy." Palmore v. United States, 411 U.S.
389,402 (1973).




59. See id. Forcing the state court to hear the case produces a different result from the
sovereign state choosing to hear the case under its concurrent jurisdiction.
60. Robinson v. Norato, 43 A.2d 467,467 (R.I. 1945).
61. In this conclusion, the Robinson court employed a conflict of laws principle. Courts
refuse to entertain suits on foreign penal causes of action. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
CONFLICT OF LAWS § 89 (1969). n addressing this choice of law rule's application to the Full
Faith and Credit Clause of the Constitution, the Supreme Court concluded that a law is penal in
nature if its purpose is to punish an offense against the state and not to remedy a private
wrong. See Huntington v. Attrill, 146 U.S. 657, 668 (1892). The Full Faith and Credit Clause
obligates a state to afford full faith and credit to the laws and decisions of the other states. See
U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 1. A law is deemed "foreign" under the choice of law rule if enacted in
another jurisdiction. See Huntington, 146 U.S. at 669-70. For a general discussion of the penal
law rule, see Peter B. Kutner, Judicial Identification of"Penal Laws" in the Conflict of Laws, 31
OKLA. L. REV. 590 (1978).
62. Robinson, 43 A.2d at 469.
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that the Supremacy Clause of the United States Constitution required
state courts to take jurisdiction.63 The court likewise did not find any
assertion by the United States Supreme Court that would force a
state court to hear such cases. 64 The Robinson court stated, "we do
not understand... [the Supreme Court] to hold that a state may not
refuse to entertain suits arising under a law of the United States if
the state court holds that such law is penal in its nature."65 The court
viewed the state of Rhode Island as foreign from the United States 66
and recognized that the penal laws of one state are not enforced by
the courts of another state.67
In Testa, the Rhode Island Supreme Court held that because
the statute was penal, an action for violation of the Act could not be
maintained in Rhode Island courts.68 Because the question "[w]hether
state courts may decline to enforce federal laws.., is a question of
great importance," the Supreme Court granted certiorari.69
The United States Supreme Court, in its Testa decision, de-
termined that the Supremacy Clause of the U.S. Constitution70 re-
quires a state court to enforce federal laws.71 The Court rejected
Rhode Island's position that the federal government possesses the
same status as its sister states, stating that this assumption disre-
gards "the fact that the States of the Union constitute a nation" and
"ignores the objective of Article VI of the Constitution."72
In reversing the state court decision, the Supreme Court re-
viewed two prior cases that addressed the power and duty of state
courts to exercise their jurisdiction in federal law cases. 73 In Claflin v.
Houseman, the Supreme Court held that absent a specific enactment
of an exclusive federal remedy, state courts are required to enforce
the laws of Congress.74 Likewise, in Mondou v. New York, New Haven
63. Id at 475.
64. See id at 474.
65. 1& at 472.
66. See id. at 471. The use of the word "foreign" in this context means separate jurisdic-
tion or political entity. See supra note 61 (noting the definition of "foreign" from Huntington,
146 U.S. at 669-70).
67. See id, at 468.
68. Testa v. Katt, 47 A.2d 312, 313 (R.I. 1946), rev'd, 330 U.S. 386 (1947).
69. Testa v. Katt, 330 U.S. 386, 388 (1947).
70. See supra notes 33-36 and accompanying text.
7L Testa, 330 U.S. at 389, 394. The Court's Testa decision now prevents state courts from
declining jurisdiction under the penal law choice of law rule discussed supra in note 61. See
generally 16 AM. JuR. 2D Conflict of Laws § 15 (1998).
72. Testa, 330 U.S. at 389.
73. See id at 390.
74. Claflin v. Houseman, 93 U.S. 130, 137 (1876). This case addressed a state court's
jurisdiction in an action to collect judgment from a party in bankruptcy. Federal courts did not
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& Hartford Railroad, the Court rejected the Connecticut Supreme
Court's ability to discriminate against a federal claim7s Based on
these decisions, the Supreme Court in Testa v. Katt held that state
courts cannot refuse to adjudicate federal claims.76
Although the opinion's actual language prohibits refusing
"enforcement" of federal claims, Testa stands for the proposition that
state courts cannot refuse to "hear" federal claims 77 While the lan-
guage appears identical, the New York and Printz decisions illustrate
that the results reached can be dramatically different. In light of the
Supremacy Clause, it is clear that state courts can not ignore federal
law7s Forcing state courts to hear federal questions is more than
mandating their recognition of federal law79 This result requires
state courts to use their resources to adjudicate federal claims.80
possess exclusive jurisdiction over bankruptcy proceedings until 1978. See 28 U.S.C. § 1334
(1993).
75. Mondou v. New York, New Haven & Hartford R.R., 223 U.S. 1, 57 (1912). Mondou
addressed a plaintiffs right to sue under the Federal Employers' Liability Act. Id. at 46-48.
The Connecticut Supreme Coort had decided against entertaining the claim. See id. at 4. The
Supreme Court reversed, denying a state court the ability to discriminate against federal claims
while hearing comparative state claims. See id. at 57, 59. Writing for the Court, Justice Van
Devanter proclaimed:
The suggestion that the act of Congress is not in harmony with the policy of the State,
and therefore that the courts of the State are free to decline jurisdiction, is quite inad-
missible, because it presupposes what in legal contemplation does not exist. When
Congress, in the exertion of the power confided to it by the Constitution, adopted that
act, it spoke for all the people and all the States, and thereby established a policy for all.
That policy is as much the policy of... [the State] as if the act had emanated from its
own legislature, and should be respected accordingly in the courts of the State.
Id. at 57. Justice Black recited this language from Mondou in Testa, 330 U.S. at 392.
76. The Testa holding does recognize the ability of a state court to decline jurisdiction of a
federal claim for a "valid excuse." Testa, 330 U.S. at 392 (citing Douglas v. New York, New
Haven & Hartford R.R., 279 U.S. 377, 388 (1929)). For a discussion on what constitutes a "valid
excuse," see Howlett v. Rose, 496 U.S. 356, 369-73 (1990).
77. See, e.g., ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, FEDERAL JURISDICTION § 3.3 (1989) (noting that "state
courts cannot refuse to hear federal claims"); RICHARD P. FALLON, Jl. ET AL., HART &
WECHSLER'S THE FEDERAL COuRTs AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM 472 (4th ed. 1996) (stating that
state courts are "under obligation" to exercise jurisdiction over federal claims). One
commentator refers to the doctrine as the "Testa principle." Evan H. Caminker, State
Sovereignty and Subordinacy: May Congress Commandeer State Officers to Implement Federal
Law?, 95 COLUM. L. Rsv. 1001, 1025 (1995). For a discussion of a different interpretation of
Testa, see Hills, supra note 9, at 928-33.
78. See supra Part II.B.2.
79. However, some opinions recognize Testa as requiring only the application of federal
law. See Employees of Dep't of Pub. Health & Welfare v. Department of Pub. Health & Welfare,
411 U.S. 279, 298 (1973) (Marshall, J., concurring) (stating that state courts are "obliged" to
enforce federal law); see also Foremost Ins. Co. v. Richardson, 457 U.S. 668, 682 (1982) (Powell,
J., dissenting) (stating that state courts are "duty bound" to apply federal law).
80. For a discussion of modern-day usage of state judiciary resources, see GRANT & NIXON,
supra note 18, at 403-07.
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The Rhode Island Supreme Court recognized that it was
obligated to give effect to federal law but distinguished such duty
from adjudicating federal laws at its own expense.8l Rhode Island
declined jurisdiction because the statute was penal in nature, not
because of the source of the law.82 In its Testa opinion, Rhode Island
asked whether it must take jurisdiction over a penal statute. The
Supreme Court rephrased the same issue in terms of whether a state
court may decline to enforce federal laws. 8 Although the argument
for conservation of state resources failed to convince the Court to
preserve the sovereignty of state courts, fifty years later a similar
concern about state resources contributed to the Court's decisions
removing state legislatures and state law enforcement officials from
federal commandeering. 4
B. State Legislatures: New York v. United States
In 1992, the Supreme Court invoked the Tenth Amendment
and the principle of state sovereignty to declare federal comman-
deering of state legislatures unconstitutional, striking down federal
legislation under the Tenth Amendment for only the second time since
1937.8 Congress passed the Low-Level Radioactive Waste Policy in
81. See Robinson v. Norato, 43 A.2d 467, 474 (R.I. 1945). The Rhode Island decision in
Testa differs in this regard from Connecticut's decision in Mondou. Connecticuts decision
blatantly discriminated against federal law by recognizing that the plaintiff had a prima facie
case but requiring him to sue under federal law instead of Connecticut state law. See Mondou v.
New York, New Haven & Hartford R.R., 73 A. 762, 763 (Conn. 1909), rev'd, 223 U.S. 1 (1911);
see also McKnett v. St. Louis & S.F. Ry., 292 U.S. 230, 241-42 (1934) (reversing Alabama's
denial ofjurisdiction for a case brought under federal law).
82. See supra note 61 for discussion of the significance of the law being characterized as
penal. Rhode Island was not prejudiced toward federal law but instead treated the federal
government the same as it would the government of another state. See Robinson, 43 A.2d at
468-69. But see supra note 5 (discussing court's position that the federal government should not
be treated as separate jurisdiction).
83. See supra notes 71-76 and accompanying text.
84. See Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 98, 117 S. Ct. 2365, 2382 (1997) (criticizing
federal legislation that forced states to absorb the financial burden of a federal program); New
York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 168 (1992) (commenting on the significance of federal
legislation providing options to the states because it gives state residents the choice of how to
allocate state resources); see also infra note 127 and accompanying text. See generally Robert
W. Adler, Unfunded Mandates and Fiscal Federalism: A Critique, 50 VAND. L. REV. 1137 (1997)
(analyzing the validity of claims against federal regulation without federal funding).
85. Furthermore, the court's prior decision declaring a federal act unconstitutional under
the Tenth Amendment has since been expressly overruled. In National League of Cities v.
Usery, 426 U.S. 833, 851-52 (1976), the Supreme Court found that a portion of the Fair Labor
Standards Act violated the states' ability to structure employment relationships and thus
declared the provision unconstitutional under the Tenth Amendment. This decision was
expressly overruled in Garcia v. San Antonio Metropolitan Transit Authority, 469 U.S. 528, 556
(1985), in which the Court found that the political process is the only protection needed by the
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1986 in an effort to promote and regulate the disposal of low-level
radioactive waste.8 The Act included a provision that offered states
the choice of regulating radioactive waste pursuant to federal
congressional direction or taking title of and assuming the
responsibilities for the radioactive waste generated within state bor-
ders.87 In New York v. United States, the Supreme Court held that
this portion of the Act88 violated the Tenth Amendment and declared
that "[t]he [flederal [g]overnment may not compel the States to enact
or administer a federal regulatory program."89
The majority of the Court in New York recognized that power
attributed to state sovereignty under the Tenth Amendment is a
power the Constitution has not given Congress.9 In reflecting on the
framework of the Constitution, the Court recognized that the case at
bar would have been "unimaginable to the Framers" because the ac-
tivity at issue as well as the notion that the federal government as-
sumed responsibility for such legislation would have been inconceiv-
able.91
The Court then referred to its decision in FERC v. Mississippi92
and noted that it "never has sanctioned explicitly a federal command
to the States to promulgate and enforce laws and regulations."93 The
language "to promulgate" appears significant because in Testa v. Katt
the Court specifically ordered the state courts to adjudicate and to
enforce federal laws and regulations. 94 Perhaps a more significant
states. But see Joseph Lipner, Imposing Federal Business on Officers of the States: What the
Tenth Amendment Might Mean, 57 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 907, 911-12 (1989) (arguing for judicially
enforceable protection of the states).
86. 42 U.S.C. § 2021b-j (1994).
87. See 42 U.S.C. § 2021e(dX2)(C) (1994).
88. See Ching, supra note 42, at 120-21 (arguing that by striking down only the take-title
provision of the Low-Level Radioactive Waste Policy, the Court ignored historical understanding
of the Commerce Clause and promoted discord among the states).
89. New York, 505 U.S. at 188. For general critiques of the New York decision, see Levy,
supra note 13; Wayne 0. Hanewicz, Note, New York v. United States: The Court Sounds a
Return to the Battle Scene, 1993 WiS. L. REv. 1605; William A. Hazeltine, Comment, New York
v. United States: A New Restriction-on Congressional Power Vis-a-vis the States?, 55 OHIO ST.
L.J. 237 (1994).
90. New York, 505 U.S. at 156. The Court quoted Justice Story: 'that what is not
conferred, is withheld, and belongs to the state authorities." Id. (citing 3 JOSEPH STORY,
COMMENTARMES ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES 752 (1833)).
91. Id. at 157.
92. FERC v. Mississippi, 456 U.S. 742 (1982). In FERC, the Court upheld sections of the
Public Utility Regulatory Policies Act, reversing the district court decision that found the
sections at issue in violation of the Tenth Amendment. Id.
93. New York, 505 U.S. at 161 (citing FERC, 456 U.S. at 761-62).
94. See supra note 77 and accompanying text; see also Levy, supra note 13, at 520 ("Testa
v. Katt... approve[s] federal statutes requiring states to engage in adjudicatory and quasi-
adjudicatory implementation in matters of individual rights.").
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distinction lies with the source of federal commandeering rather than
the branch of state government subject to commandeering. Although
the Court has never sanctioned such a congressional command to the
states, the Court itself has federally commandeered state courts.95
Regardless, in New York the Court concluded that Congress regulates
individuals, not the states.96 The United States argued that its
congressional directive was based on a federal interest sufficient to
overcome the Tenth Amendment hurdle.7 The Court responded that
if Congress deemed this action important, it could regulate waste
directly.98
The Court similarly dismissed the argument that federal
commandeering of state governments is constitutional, finding it
inapplicable to state legislatures.9 First, the Court reasoned that
Testa and its companion cases involve regulation of individuals.9 6 In
the Court's view, the Supremacy Clause authorizes the Court to com-
mand state courts to adjudicate, but "[n]o comparable constitutional
provision authorizes Congress to command state legislatures to legis-
late."O1 Second, the Court interpreted the powers enumerated to the
Court in Article III of the Constitution as authorizing federal court
direction while finding "no analogous grant of authority to Congress"
in Article j.102
The government's next argument provided another opportunity
for the Court to distinguish itself from Congress. The United States
argued that the Court resolves conflicts among states, and suggested
that Congress could act analogously under the Commerce Clause. os
Referencing the Framers and particulary The Federalist,1°4 the Court
95. This issue is explored further in Part VI, infra.
96. New York, 505 U.S. at 166. But see FERC, 456 U.S. at 761-62 (rejecting Justice
O'Connor's dissenting opinion that the Framers intended to prohibit the exercise of federal
legislative power over the states).
97. See New York, 505 U.S. at 177.
98. See id. at 178. Compare this result with the ability of state courts to decline jurisdic-
tion of federal claims for a "valid excuse" discussed supra note 76.
99. See id. at 178-79.
100. See id
101. Id. Compare Levy, supra note 13, at 505 (arguing that such interpretation allows
state legislatures and state officials to disobey federal law), with Caminker, supra note 77, at
1029-30 (asserting that all state actors are subject to affirmative conduct directed from
Congress).
102. New York, 505 U.S. at 179.
103. See id. at 180. Differences between the states in their handling of low-level radioac-
tive wastes, or lack thereof, prompted Congress to pass the act at issue. See id. at 149-54. For
an argument that the New York Court ignored the historical understanding of the Commerce
Clause, see Ching, supra note 42, at 114-21.
104. See supra note 25 (discussing reliance on The Federalist).
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dismissed the theory that Congress possessed such power.1°5 The New
York opinion, however, failed to comment on the constitutional
authority for the Court's commandeering.
The New York decision concluded by claiming that the Tenth
Amendment's protection of state sovereignty is as basic as the "air
around us."1°6 According to the Court, the Constitution divides power
to avoid a concentration of power in one branch of government and
does not authorize Congress to compel the states to regulate in any
particular fashion.10 7 Hence, state legislatures are explicitly exempted
from federal commandeering.
C. State Executive Officials: Printz v. United States
In 1997, the deciding vote regarding federal commandeering of
state government branches was cast. The Testa and New York de-
cisions left state courts subjugated to federal order while state legisla-
tures were protected from federal commandeering. The Court had not
yet considered whether the third branch of state government, execu-
tive officials, was subject to federal commandeering. In Printz v.
United States,10 8 the Court held that state executive officials, like
state legislators, were not subject to federal order. °9
Congress amended the Gun Control Act of 1968110 with the
Brady Act in 1993. In the Brady Act, Congress required the Attorney
105. See New York, 505 U.S. at 180.
106. Id. at 187.
107. See id at 187-88.
108. Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 98, 117 S. Ct. 2365 (1997).
109. Id. at 2383. For a general analysis of the Printz decision, see Decision, Congress May
Not Command State Officials to Enforce Federal Program: Jay Printz v. United States, No. 95-
1478, and Richard Mack v. United States, No. 95-1503 (U.S. June 27, 1997), NAAG NATVL
ENVTL. ENFORCEMENT J., Aug. 1997, at 13; Leading Case, Federalism-Compelling State
Officials to Enforce Federal Regulatory Regimes, 111 HARV. L. REV. 207 (1997). Printz was
decided during President Clinton's administration. For an argument that the Clinton admini-
stration has influenced a trend favoring state and local government and for an analysis of other
Supreme Court decisions during the administration, see Robert H. Freilich et al., The Return to
State Autonomy: The Eleventh Amendment and Other Key Decisions of the U.S. Supreme Court
and Lower Courts Affecting State and Local Government 1995-96, 28 URB. LAW. 563 (1996)
[hereinafter Freilich, The Return to State Autonomy]; Robert Freilich et al., The Supreme Court
and State and Local Government: Small Change for a Changing Court, 26 URB. LAW. 623 (1994)
[hereinafter Freilich, Small Change]; Frank J. Macchiarola, State and Local Government Power
and the 1994-1995 Term of the United States Supreme Court, 11 ST. JOHN'S J. LEGAL COMENT.
19 (1995). Prior to the New York decision in 1992, a study found that states had little success in
cases before the Court. See Douglas Ross & Michael W. Catalano, How State and Local
Governments Fared in the United States Supreme Court for the Past Five Terms, 20 URB. LAW.
341, 341 (1988). Nevertheless, the relative success of the states in civil cases lacked any
apparent trend from year to year. See id. at 347.
110. 18 U.S.C.§§ 921-30 (1994).
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General to establish a national system of background checks for
potential purchasers of firearms by 1998.111 During the interim, in
order to implement this system, the Act required state chief law
enforcement officers ("CLEOs) to perform background checks and
related duties unless the state had either a system of gun permits
available to all potential purchasers or the capability of performing
instant background checks."2 County sheriffs Jay Printz and Richard
Mack brought separate suits challenging the constitutionality of
requiring state officers to perform these tasks."3 Recognizing division
among the lower courts, the Supreme Court granted certiorari."14
The Printz majority based its holding on historical practice,
constitutional structure, and Supreme Court jurisprudence1"5 Unlike
the New York Court, which distinguished judicial and non-judicial
commandeering," 6 the Court in Printz focused on the differences be-
tween state courts and the two other branches. The early law estab-
lished imposing an obligation on state judges.1 7 According to the
Printz Court, state courts are treated differently under the
Supremacy Clause because they apply the law of other sovereigns.18
Although the federal government can seek participation from state
executive officials, it cannot command such participation. Federal
commandeering does not flow automatically from the duties assumed
111. See Brady Handgun Violence Prevention Act, Pub. L. No. 103-159, 107 Stat. 1536
(1993), as amended by Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1994, Pub. L. No.
103-322, 103 Stat. 1796, 2074 (1994).
112. 18 U.S.C. § 922(s).
113. See Printz, 117 S. Ct. at 2368-69. Jay Printz was the CLEO for Ravalli County,
Montana. Richard Mack served as the CLEO for Graham County, Arizona. See id. at 2369.
114. See id. The present petitioners' cases were consolidated and considered together by
the Ninth Circuit, which held the Act constitutional. See infra note 141 and accompanying text.
However, the Fifth Circuit reached an opposite conclusion in Koog v. United States, 852 F.
Supp. 1376, 1389 (W.D. Tex. 1994), rev'd, 79 F.3d 452 (5th Cir. 1996). For a comparison of the
contradictory results, see Amy Marie Pepke, The Brady Bill: Surviving the Tenth Amendment,
48 VAND. L. REv. 1803 (1995).
115. Printz, 117 S. Ct. at 2370.
116. See supra notes 97-105 and accompanying text.
117. See Printz, 117 S. Ct. at 2371. In its historical discussion, the Printz Court stated that
federal commandeering of state government branches other than the judiciary was such a new
phenomenon that the Court did not address it until the 1970s. See id. at 2379. While this
assertion may be correct, the issue of federal commandeering had certainly been considered
outside of the Court earlier than that. As early as 1781, James Madison proposed giving
Congress coercive authority over the states. See RAKOVE, supra note 15, at 37. In addressing
the supremacy of the Constitution, the Framers considered coercive methods. See supra note 25
(discussing reliance on Framers' "original intent). The Virginia Plan incorporated the use of
these types of measures against defiant states. See RAKOVE, supra note 15, at 172. Madison,
however, found such coercion to be more like a declaration of war than an infliction of
punishment. See id. Apparently, coercion of state government branches other than the
judiciary is not as novel an idea as the Court suggests.
118. Id.
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by a CLEO because such interpretation would subject state
legislatures to federal commandeering, a practice expressly prohibited
by New York." 9 The Court likewise found historical support for
protecting state officials from federal commandeering. In particular,
the Court noted that when implementing an executive act, President
Wilson requested the services of state governors instead of
commandeering their services. 120 If the federal executive branch
respected the sovereignty of state executive officials under the
exigencies of wartime, Congress should acknowledge the same
sovereignty and recognize its lack of power to force action by state
executive officers.'
2'
Using analysis similar to that used in New York, the Printz
Court stated that federal regulation may affect individuals but not
states.2 2 Quoting Hamilton's Federalist No. 15,m the Court recog-
nized that people are the appropriate targets of federal governmental
action.'24 The Court reasoned that keeping the spheres of state and
federal government separate honors the structure of the Constitution
while allowing the federal government to compel service by state
officials amplifies the power of the federal government in violation of
the Constitution's structural protections. 25
In Printz, the United States first attempted to distinguish the
Brady Act's background check provision from the take-title portion of
the Low-Level Radioactive Waste Policy of 1985 outlawed in New
York. The Court was unconvinced that the distinction "improves
rather than worsens the intrusion upon state sovereignty."'2 The
government's second attempt at distinguishing its case from New
York failed because under the Brady Act, the states were forced to
bear the financial burden of the federal program and were held
accountable for the burdens or defects resulting from the background
check system.127 The final argument for the constitutionality of the
Brady Act was premised on a combination of the grave importance of
119. See id. at 2372-74. But see id. at 2391 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
120. See id. at 2375-76.
121. Justice Scalia's point here lends support to distinguishing New York and Printz from
Testa based on whether the source of the commandeering is judicial or non-judicial. See infra
Part VI.
122. Printz, 117 S. Ct. at 2377. See supra note 96 and accompanying text.
123. See supra note 25 (discussing reliance on The Federalist).
124. See Printz, 117 S. Ct. at 2377.
125. See id. at 2377-78.
126. Id. at 2380-81.
127. See id, at 2382.
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the Act and the limited hardship forced on state executive officials.
The Court rejected this balancing of interests, recognizing that no
federal competing interest can outweigh the fundamental importance
of state sovereignty.129
The Court held that the Brady Act unconstitutionally com-
mandeered state law enforcement officials.1 0 Therefore, the federal
government is prevented from issuing directives that require state
legislation or that command administration by state executive
officers.'8 ' The state judiciary remains the only branch of state
government that is subject to federal commandeering.
IV. DISTINGUISHING STATE COURTS FROM STATE LEGISLATURES
AND STATE EXECUTIVES
Justification for treating state courts differently than the other
two state government branches may be sought by comparing the char-
acteristics of courts to the legislative and executive branches.
However, most distinguishing features of courts fail to justify this
differing treatment.
128. See id. at 2383. The "law is significant" argument failed for the government in New
York. See supra notes 97-99 and accompanying text. The government argued that CLEOs were
subjected to only a limited hardship because their participation was required for only an interim
time period.
129. See Printz, 117 S. Ct. at 2383.
130. See id.
131. See id. at 2384. Lower courts, however, have declined to extend the principles of New
York and Printz on several occasions. The Ninth Circuit decided that the Nuclear Waste Policy
Act provided the states an opportunity to participate in repository siting decisions and thus did
not unconstitutionally commandeer the states. See Nevada v. United States Dept. of Energy,
133 F.3d 1201, 1207-08 (9th Cir. 1998). Similarly, the Interstate Horseracing Act of 1978 sur-
vived New York challenges in the Sixth Circuit. There, the court distinguished the ability of the
states to ignore requests for consent to off-track betting from the facts of New York. See
Kentucky Div., Horsemen's Benevolent & Protective Assoc. v. Turfway Park Racing Assoc., 20
F.3d 1406, 1415-16 (6th Cir. 1994). The Fifth Circuit declined to extend New York and Printz to
invalidate 19 U.S.C. § 810(e), which exempts business property located inside Foreign Trade
Zones from state and local taxes. See Deer Park Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Harris County Appraisal
Dist., 132 F.3d 1095, 1097-100 (5th Cir. 1998), cert. denied, 118 S. Ct. 2343 (1998); see also City
of New York v. United States, 971 F.Supp. 789, 791-96 (S.D.N.Y. 1997) (upholding section 434 of
the Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 1996 and section 642 of
the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996 which preempted a
city ordinance governing dissemination of alien immigration status information, because unlike
the commandeering found in New York and Printz, these acts merely prevent interference);
Association of Community Orgs. for Reform Now v. Miller, 912 F. Supp. 976, 983-85 (W.D. Mich.
1995), affd, 129 F.3d 833 (6th Cir. 1997) (finding that the National Voters Registration Act was
not invalidated by New York due to Congressional power under Article I, section 4 of the
Constitution).
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A. The Function and Purpose of State Courts
Arguably, the justification for federally commandeering state
courts and not the other branches of state government lies in the
function and purpose of a court. The judicial branch's primary role is
to hear litigants' claims and to resolve their disputes. Unlike the
legislative or executive branches, the judiciary does not regulate or
implement policy.18 2 The Supremacy Clause binds state judges, not
the other branches of state government.8 8 This distinction was
emphasized in the New York decision'14 as well as in the Printz
decision.8 5 Courts always apply the law of other sovereigns, unlike
the other two branches of state government.13 6 Moreover, state courts
possess primitive jurisdiction regarding federal law.37 Therefore, the
function of courts may be used to distinguish Testa from New York
and Printz.
Many authorities, however, have found little, if any, difference
between the role of the CLEOs at issue in Printz and the adjudicatory
function of state courts. The Supreme Court's decision in Dreyer v.
Illinois s8 has developed into a doctrine "establishing that 'separation
of powers principles do not apply to the States.' "139 That is, the roles
of the state executive branch and the state judiciary are nearly identi-
cal.140 Accordingly, in its review of the obligation placed on county
sheriffs Jay Printz and Richard Mack, the Ninth Circuit distinguished
the mandate for states to legislate from the action required by the
Brady Act.'4' The argument that the functions of state officials and
132. Yet, state courts possess a position of authority comparable to the other two branches.
See Hart, supra note 19, at 499.
133. See supra note 33.
134. See supra note 101 and accompanying text.
135. See supra note 118 and accompanying text.
136. See supra note 118 and accompanying text. Of course, a court's enforcement of
another sovereign's law is limited by the choice of law rules, such as the penal law exception
utilized by Rhode Island in Testa v. Katt. See supra note 61 and accompanying text.
137. See supra note 22 and accompanying text.
138. Dreyer v. Illinois, 187 U.S. 71 (1902).
139. David A. Martland, Justice Without Favor: Due Process and Separation of Executive
and Judicial Powers in State Government, 94 YALE L.J. 1675, 1680 (1985) (quoting Caron v.
United States, 548 F.2d 366, 367 (1st. Cir. 1976)).
140. For a discussion regarding the institutional design of state governmental branches,
see generally Clayton P. Gillette, Expropriation and Institutional Design in State and Local
Government Law, 80 VA. L. REV. 625 (1994).
141. See Mack v. United States, 66 F.3d 1025, 1030 (9th Cir. 1995), rev'd sub nom. Printz v.
United States, 521 U.S. 98, 117 S. Ct. 2365 (1997). For additional commentary on the Ninth
Circuit's conclusion that the state executive branch should be treated the same as the state
judicial branch, see Boehne, supra note 13, at 1136-38; Freilich, The Return to State Autonomy,
supra note 109, at 585. Professor Caminker likewise predicted that the court would reach the
opposite result in Printz. See Caminker, supra note 77, at 1028-29.
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the state judiciary are identical allows two reasonable conclusions:
Either Printz was incorrectly decided by the Supreme Court,42 or the
dispute-resolving role of courts fails to justify federal commandeering
of state courts.
B. The Non-Political Nature of American Judiciaries
The non-political nature of the courts has been used to justify
different federal treatment. Among the governmental branches, the
judicial branch is the only one that is traditionally non-political.
Legislators and executive branch officials are normally elected by
popular vote while judges are traditionally appointed. In Garcia v.
San Antonio Metropolitan Transit Authority, the Supreme Court
found that the political process adequately protected state
sovereignty.'4 Although not expressly overruling Garcia, the Court in
New York and Printz, recognizing some deficiency in the protection
afforded by the political process, provided additional protection
through the Tenth Amendment. If state rights, and ultimately the
rights of their residents, cannot find protection in their politically-
elected representatives, then the non-political nature of courts does
not justify the decision in Testa.
Moreover, while Article Il judges are appointed, over three-
fourths of the states choose their judges by popular election. 1' In
general, the election of judges is similar to the election of other state
officials.14s Therefore, state judiciaries are not significantly less po-
litical than the other two branches of state government.146 The non-
political distinction fails as a justification for federally commandeer-
ing state courts.
142. Clearly, the Supreme Court determined that the state executive branch more closely
resembled the state legislative branch. In Printz, the Court found little distinction between
making law and merely enforcing it because policymaking almost always accompanies
enforcement of the law. See Printz, 117 S. Ct. at 2380-81. This Note, however, does not purport
to address the correctness of the Printz decision. For a general critique of the Printz decision
and its effects on federalism, see Vicki C. Jackson, Federalism and the Uses and Limits of Law:
Printz and Principle?, 111 HARV. L. REV. 2180 (1998).
143. Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528 (1985); see also supra note
85.
144. See GRANT & NIXON, supra note 18, at 394; see also GLICK & VINES, supra note 19, at
40 (noting that only seven states select their judges purely by appointment).
145. See GLICK & VINES, supra note 19, at 36.
146. See GRANT & NIXON, supra note 18, at 396-98 (analyzing judges' role in politics). For a
discussion of the five different systems utilized to select state judges and an analysis of the
politics involved in each system, see GLICK& VINES, supra note 19, at 39-47.
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C. The Permissive Creation of Federal Courts
Article III of the Constitution provides for the creation of lower
federal courts as "Congress may from time to time ordain and estab-
lish."147 Consequently, the existence of federal courts other than the
Supreme Court results from Congress' discretionary power. If the
lower federal courts were not created,14s the implication would be that
the state courts are subject to the direction of the Supreme Court.
The adjudication of federal claims would be left to the states "by the
simple expedient of not creating federal court juridiction to hear such
claims."49 Therefore, many argue that the discretionary creation of
inferior federal courts provides support for the Testa result and for
distinguishing state courts from state legislatures or state officials in
the context of the commandeering debate.
Although in theory this argument is plausible, at the time of
the Testa decision, lower federal courts already existed. 150 The federal
commandeering of state judiciaries needs greater justification than a
hypothetical argument. Thus, the permissive creation of the courts
does not justify the federal comandeering of state courts.
V. REANALYZING THE TESTA DECISION
The New York and Printz Courts distinguished state legisla-
tures and state executives from state courts to justify different treat-
ment of the three branches,' s1 but because state courts are not charac-
teristically dissimilar from the other two branches, the distinctions
discussed above fail to justify the commandeering of state courts per-
mitted by Testa. Therefore, the question remains as to what permits
the differing outcome of Testa when compared to New York and
Printz. Because of this unresolved tension, a reanalysis of the
Supreme Court's decision in Testa is required.
Testa v. Katt is a choice of law case. In declining to adjudicate
Mr. Testa's claim, the Rhode Island Supreme Court was utilizing the
147. U.S. CoNsT. art. MI, § 1.
148. For a discussion of the creation and jurisdiction of the lower federal courts, see gen-
erally John Harrison, The Power of Congress to Limit the Jurisdiction of Federal Courts and the
Text ofArticle Iff, 64 U. Cm. L. REV. 203 (1997).
149. 32 AM. JUR. 2D Federal Courts § 3 (1995).
150. The lower federal courts even possessed jurisdiction to hear state law claims in diver-
sity cases. See supra note 28.
151. See supra notes 101 and 117 and accompanying text. But see Caminker, supra note




rule which prevents its state courts from hearing a case involving the
penal laws of another jurisdiction.15 2 In Testa, however, the Supreme
Court completely ignored or perhaps misunderstood the Rhode Island
decision. The Court stated that "[e]xcept for the penalty feature," the
Rhode Island court's decision was "strikingly similar" to the precedent
in Mondou.153 Yet, the "penalty feature" was the basis for Rhode
Island's decision. 154 The Supreme Court also held that a state could
not decline jurisdiction because of the state's "established policy"
against such enforcement. 55 However, in doing so, the Court confused
two different choice of law rules. Courts may refuse to entertain a
foreign cause of action if its enforcement is contrary to the strong
public policy of the forum court. 156 The state court decision in Testa
was not based on this rule, but instead, on the penal law choice of law
rule. The Court, relying on the Supremacy Clause, asserted its own
authority over state courts. Unfortunately, its decision misconstrued
the state's argument and therefore produced a result that lacks a
proper basis. 57
VI. RECONCILING TESTA: FEDERAL COMMANDEERING
AS A JUDICIAL POWER?
As shown above, the Testa decision lacks a proper foundation,
leaving open the question of why federal commandeering of state
courts is permitted. Although the reasoning in Testa is incorrect, the
doctrine created by the decision has been accepted throughout more
than fifty years of jurisprudence, including the recent New York and
Printz decisions. Given the passage of time and the evolution of the
law between Testa and the New York and Printz decisions, we must
152. See supra note 68.
153. Testa v. Katt, 330 U.S. 386, 392 (1946).
154. See supra note 65 and accompanying text.
155. Testa, 330 U.S. at 392-93.
156. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 90 (1969).
157. A better argument for the Court's decision in Testa would have focused on the
jurisdictional characterizations of the choice of law rules. Although the states may be sovereign
entities, the Court has refused to accept them as separate jurisdictions. See supra note 5. If the
jurisdictions were the same, then the Rhode Island court misapplied the choice of law rule. See
supra note 61. The Testa court alluded to this result but failed to develop it or for that matter
illustrate any understanding of it beyond its Supremacy Clause analysis. Testa, 330 U.S. at
389; see also WENDELL, supra note 28, at 20 ("Yet our various court systems cannot be




consider whether there is any principled justification for continued
adherence to the doctrine of federal commandeering of state courts.
One way to try to reconcile Testa with the later cases
invalidating federal commandeering is to consider what branch of
state government is being commandeered. Thus one commentator,
writing after New York but before Printz, suggested that the
distinguishing factor is whether the branch is involved in lawmaking
as opposed to law enforcement, and predicted on this basis that state
executive officials would fall under the same analysis as state courts
and be commandeered by the federal government."" Instead, the
Printz court held that state executive officials, like state legislatures,
are immune from federal commandeering.
If Testa's outcome cannot be reconciled based upon the state
government branch being commandeered, perhaps its divergent
outcome is explained by which federal branch is doing the
commandeering. In New York and Printz, the Court held that
Congress unconstitutionally commandeered state legislatures and
state executive officials. 159 In Testa, however, the Supreme Court
commandeered the state court systems. 160 Although one commentator
has argued that "the justifications for the absence of federalism as a
limit on federal powers apply as much to the federal judiciary as to
Congress,"16 it may matter whether it is the federal courts-rather
than Congress or the executive branch-that is doing the
commandeering. 162
Arguably, the Supreme Court has the power, unique amongst
the branches of the federal government, to commandeer the states. 16
Indeed, the Court recognizes its own superior power to
commandeer.' 64  In New York, the Court found its power to
158. See Caminker, supra note 77, at 1028-29, 1053.
159. See supra notes 88-91, 130 and accompanying text.
160. See supra note 76 and accompanying text.
161. Chemerinsky, supra note 44, at 505. This limit is based on comity, i.e., respect for
state governments. See id. at 509.
162. See Scott E. Gant, Judicial Supremacy and Nonjudicial Interpretation of the
Constitution, 24 HASTiNGs CONST. L.Q. 359, 367-73 (1997) (discussing roots and criticisms of
judicial supremacy).
163. The Supreme Court in New York found such power in the Supremacy Clause and in
Article H. New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 178-79 (1992); see also supra notes 99-102
and accompanying text. One commentator suggests that it was Chief Justice John Marshall's
expansive interpretation of the Supremacy Clause in McCullough v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4
Wheat.) 316 (1819) that gave the Court such power. See Hoke, supra note 36, at 835-36.
164. The First Circuit found the power of a federal court to grant injunctive relief against a
state official differed from the federal commandeering struck down in New York and Printz. See
Strahan v. Coxe, 127 F.3d 155, 169-71 (1st Cir. 1997). Obviously, the First Circuit viewed -the
role of federal courts as distinct from the role of Congress.
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commandeer rooted in Article III, while finding "[n1o comparable
constitutional provision" giving Congress the same power.165 When
the Printz Court considered amplifying Congress's power, it found
that this increase in power violated the Constitution's structural
protections.166 The Printz opinion also implies that the executive
branch lacks constitutional authority to commandeer. 167 In effect, the
Court's interpretation of the Constitution increases its portion of
federal power over the states.
The origin of the commandeering also creates a plausible dis-
tinction under a different approach. Specifically, the Court's interpre-
tation of the Tenth Amendment creates a distinction based on origin.
The Tenth Amendment has been consistently viewed as leaving the
states power not otherwise enumerated to Congress. If congressional
power is the only power potentially prohibited by this amendment,
then commandeering by the Court is distinguished from the comman-
deering by congress that was invalidated in New York and Printz.16
The strictest scrutiny under the Tenth Amendment is directed
at legislative action. 69 At one point the Court implied that, where
Congress has power, it can act as if the states do not exist. 70 In
Garcia, the Court addressed the Tenth Amendment and its ability to
invalidate federal legislation.171 Arguably, state courts are subject to
federal commandeering by the Supreme Court because the interpreta-
tion of the Tenth Amendment restricts Congress's power, not the
power of the Court.72 Thus, the Tenth Amendment may provide a
165. New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 179 (1992).
166. See supra note 125 and accompanying text.
167. See supra note 121 and accompanying text.
168. Indeed, the Tenth Amendment was never even mentioned in Testa; instead, the
Court's decision rests on its interpretation of the Supremacy Clause. Testa v. Katt, 330 U.S.
386, 389-94 (1947); see also supra Part M.A. Compare the Testa Court's conclusions regarding
the Supremacy Clause with the assertions made by Professor Hoke, supra note 36, at 842
(stating that the Court's indulgence of the Supremacy Clause does "not have unequivocal
doctrinal support as formulated7). This Note, however, does not purport to determine, or even
to address, whether the Court has the authority to make such a determination.
169. See Abrams, supra note 39, at 738. One commentator criticizes the inconsistency with
which the Court utilizes the Tenth Amendment: "Almost simultaneous with the Court's
rejection of the Tenth Amendment as a limit on Congress, the Court relied on it to explain that
the federal common law had 'invaded rights which... are reserved by the Constitution to the
several states.'" Erwin Chemerinsky, Federalism Not as Limits, but as Empowerment, 45 U.
KAN. L. REV. 1219, 1223 (1996) (quoting Erie R.R. v. Tompkins, 204 U.S. 64, 80 (1938)).
170. See Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (1 Wheat.) 1, 196-97 (1824).
171. Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528,556 (1985).
172. However, the Tenth Amendment has been used to restrict jurisdiction of federal
courts. See supra text accompanying note 47. Professor Chemerinsky has noted: "Indeed, in
numerous decisions over the past thirty years, the Court has used federalism to limit federal
judicial power.... Similarly, the Court has invoked concerns about state sovereignty and
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distinction between state court commandeering and the commandeer-
ing found unconstitutional in New York and Printz.
This conclusion, however, is contrary to an earlier policy as-
serted by the Court. "Courts are reluctant to adjudge any statute" as
being contrary to the fundamental law of the Constitution because
"[e]very presumption is to be indulged in favor of faithful compliance
by Congress."173 Against this assertion, the Supreme Court invali-
dated two "commandeering" acts of Congress while permitting its own
commandeering of state courts. 174 Perhaps this distinction can be
explained by the origin of state court commandeering and by the
Tenth Amendment's implicit limitation on Congress's power.
Nonetheless, state court commandeering must be revisited.
VII. CONCLUSION
Testa v. Katt placed state courts under federal direction, where
they have remained for fifty-two years. Within the past seven years,
the Court has found that congressional commandeering of state
legislatures and state law enforcement officials violates the Tenth
Amendment. State courts, however, are not distinguishable from the
other state governmental branches. In reconciling federal com-
mandeering'7 5 of state courts, one essential conclusion results: It is
the source of the commandeering at the federal level that permits the
differing conclusions. The Supreme Court is willing to commandeer
state courts but unwilling to permit congressional commandeering of
state legislatures or state executives. Still, Testa has been accepted
as a doctrine of federalism.7 6 Given the nature of courts and the view
of the Supreme Court, it is unlikely that a state court's cry of
autonomy as justifications for restricting the scope of federal habeas corpus review."
Chemerinsky, supra note 169, at 1224.
173. United States v. Butler, 297 U.S. 1, 67 (1936).
174. "As the Court did with separation of powers in the 1980s, the federalism decisions of
the 1990s have reasoned deductively from assumed major premises and have largely ignored
functional considerations in allocating power between federal and state governments."
Chemerinsky, supra note 41, at 960.
175. For an argument that the friction between the federal and state governments is
"conducive... to good government," see Candace H. Beckett, Essay, Separation of Powers and
Federalism: Their Impact on Individual Liberty and the Functioning of Our Government, 29
WM. & MARY L. REV. 635, 641-42 (1988).
176. For a discussion of modern day federalism, see generally Richard E. Levy & Stephen
R. McAllister, Defining the Roles of the National and State Governments in the American
Federal System: A Symposium, 45 U. KAN. L. REv. 971 (1997).
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sovereignty will ever produce the same treatment that has been given
to its sister state branches.
177
Tonya M. Gray*
177. However, one commentator predicts that, in light of the New York opinion, "attempts
to impose federal substantive and procedural requirements upon state courts will also be closely
scrutinized." Lebow, supra note 9, at 683.
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